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THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE 
PART IV 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
This is the fourth in a series of articles examin-
ing the Rules of Evidence as they apply in criminal 
cases. 
RULE 701: LAY OPINION TESTIMONY 
Rule 701 governs the admissibility of lay opinion 
testimony. The rule provides that the opinion of a 
nonexpert is admissible if "(1) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a 
clear understanding of his testimony or the deter-
mination of a fact in issue." According to the Staff 
Note, Rule 701 "is in accordance with Ohio law as 
it has developed prior to the adoption of the Rules 
of Evidence." Notwithstanding this statement, 
Rule 701 changes the formulation of the lay opin-
ion rule. 
The opinion rule is not designed to exclude tes-
timony that is merely speculation or conjecture on 
the part of a witness. The firsthand knowledge rule 
serves that function. See Rule 602. Rule 701 incor-
porates the firsthand knowledge rule by requiring 
that an opinion be "rationally based on the percep-
tion of the witness." The opinion rule is designed 
to encourage witnesses to relate their knowledge 
in concrete rather than abstract terms, to relate 
primary sensory perceptions rather than inferences 
or conclusions drawn from those perceptions. See 
C. McCormick, Evidence 25 (2d ed. 1972). 
According to the prior Ohio cases, the opinion 
rule required that "witnesses shall testify to facts 
and not opinions." Railroad Co. v. Schultz, 43 OS 
270, 282, 1 NE 324, 331-32 (1885). The courts, how-
ever, recognized an exception: "[N]on-experts may, 
in cases where it is not practicable to place before 
the jury all the primary facts upon which they are 
founded, state their opinions from such facts ... " 
ld. This exception included opinions concerning 
"questions of identity as applied to persons, 
things, animals, or handwriting; and of the size, 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
color, and weight of objects; of time and dis-
tances; of the mental state or condition of another; 
of insanity and intoxication; of the affection of one 
for another; of the physical condition of another as 
to health or sickness ... ; of values ... " I d. at 281. 
See also State v. Auerbach, 108 OS 96, 98, 140 NE 
507, 508 (1923) ("estimates of height, temperature, 
speed, time, light, weight, identity, dimension, size 
and distance."). 
The exception was even broader than the above 
cases suggest because the courts also recognized 
that the decision to admit lay opinion testimony 
was entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. In 
Auerback the Supreme Court remarked: "It rests 
within the sound discretion of the court whether 
the witness may express an opinion or not." ld. 
at 98. 
Instead of adopting the fact-opinion dichotomy 
along with an ill-defined exception, Rule 701 
adopts a different formula. The standard under the 
rule is whether a witness' opinion, based on first-
hand knowledge, is helpful to a clear understand-
ing of the witness' testimony or to the determina-
tion of the issues in the case. This formulation of 
the opinion rule was adopted because the tradi-
tional formulation was deficient in several 
respects. First, the application of the traditional 
rule turned an illusory fact-opinion dichotomy. This 
proved unworkable because "there is no distinc-
tion in kind between fact and opinion; the distinc-
tion is one of degree." E. Morgan, Basic Problems 
of Evidence 216 (1963). For example, a witness 
who testifies that a defendant had "slurred 
speech" and "staggered" when he walked, is us-
ing inferences as much as the witness who testi-
fies that the defendant was "intoxicated;" the dif-
ference is "one of degree." 
Second, witnesses frequently use inferences 
while testifying since it is the natural way to tell a 
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story. In some cases, it is the only way to tell a 
story. A strict application of the opinion rule would 
stultify the presentation of testimony. As Judge 
Learned Hand commented: 
Every judge of experience in the trial of causes has 
again and again seen the whole story garbled, 
because of insistence upon a form with which the wit-
ness cannot comply, since, like most men, he is 
unaware of the extent to which inference enters into 
his perceptions. He is telling the "facts" in the only 
way that he knows how, and the result of nagging and 
checking him is often to choke him altogether, which 
is, indeed, usually its purpose. Central R.R. v. 
Monahan, 11 F(2d) 212,214 (2d Cir.1926). 
Third, the traditional rule is unnecessary. In 
most instances the adversary system has built-in 
mechanisms that mitigate the undesirable effects 
of opinion testimony. Because "the detailed ac-
count carries more conviction than the broad 
assertion, and a lawyer can be expected to display 
his witness to the best advantage," counsel will 
tend to elicit concrete rather than abstract testi-
mony. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 
701. Furthermore, opposing counsel can expose 
through cross-examination the weaknesses in 
opinion testimony. /d. 
There are, however, limits on the types of opin-
ions that may be admitted. As the Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Federal Rule 701 points out, if 
"attempts are made to introduce meaningless 
assertions which amount to little more than choos-
ing up sides, exclusion for lack of helpfulness is 
called for by the rule." See Mynatt v. Drenik -Bever-
age Distributing, Inc., 119 App 28, 188 NE(2d) 612 
(1963) (opinion as to fault excluded). In this 
respect, several federal cases seem to have been 
decided wrongly; they have admitted opinions con-
cerning the mens rea of 9riminal defendants. See 
United States v. McClintic, 570 F(2d) 685 (8th Cir. 
1978); United States v. Smith, 550 F(2d) 277 (5th 
Cir. 1977); but see United States v. Phillips, 600 
F(2d) 535, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1979). 
RULE 702: EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Subject Matter of Expert Testimony 
Rule 703 provides that an expert witness may 
testify on a subject involving "scientific, technical, 
otother specialized knowledge" if his testimony 
"will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue." Wigmore's 
formulation of the test for expert testimony is con-
sistent with Rule 702: "On this subject can a jury 
from this person receive appreciable help?" 7 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence§ 1923, at 29 (Chadbourn rev. 
1978). See also C. McCormick, Evidence 30 (2d ed. 
1972). 
The prior Ohio rule was stated in McKay Ma-
chine Co. v. Rodman, 11 OS(2d) 77, 228 NE(2d) 304 
(1967): "In all proceedings involving matters of a 
scientific, mechanical, professional or other like 
nature, requiring special study, experience or 
observation not within the common knowledge of 
laymen, expert opinion testimony is admissible to 
aid the court or the jury in arriving at a correct 
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determination of the litigated issue." /d. (syllabus, 
para. 1). This test is similar to the test stated in 
Rule 702. The McKay Machine Co. opinion uses 
the term "aid" the jury; the rule uses the term 
"assist" the jury. McKay Machine Co. as well as 
other Ohio cases, however, also emphasizes that 
the subject matter of expert testimony must be 
beyond the "common knowledge of laymen." See 
State v. Maupin, 42 OS(2d) 473, 479, 330 NE(2d) 
708, 713 (1975) ("beyond the common experience 
and knowledge of juries"). 
In one sense, focusing on the "common knowl-
edge of laymen" does not differ from the standard 
of Rule 702. If a matter falls within the "common 
knowledge of laymen," the jury is presumed to be 
knowledgeable about the matter and therefore ex-
pert testimony would not "assist" the jury. Never-
theless, the emphasis of the rule points in another 
direction. Many subjects are not entirely beyond a 
lay juror's comprehension and yet expert testi-
mony should be admitted under Rule 702 because 
it will assist the jury. Handwriting comparisons il-
lustrate this point. Although the jurors may com-
pare handwriting exemplars to determine common 
authorship, a questioned document examiner's tes-
timony is superior and would be admissible under 
Rule 702. 
The trial court has "broad discretion in the mat-
ter of the admission or exclusion of expert evi-
dence, and his action is to be sustained unless 
manifestly erroneous." Salem v. United States 
Lines Co., 370 US 31, 35 (1962). Accord, Fowler v. 
Young, 77 App 20, 31, 65 NE(2d) 399, 405 (1945). 
Qualifications of Expert Witnesses 
Rule 702 provides that a witness may qualify as 
an expert by reason of "knowledge, skill, exper-
ience, training, or education." The Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Federal Rule 702 contains the fol-
lowing comment: "[T]he expert is viewed, not in a 
narrow sense, but as a person qualified by 'knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training or education.' 
Thus, within the scope of the rule are not only ex-
perts in the strictest sense, e.g., physicians, physi-
cists, and architects, but also the large group 
sometimes called 'skilled' witnesses, such as 
bankers or landowners testifying to land values." 
Wigmore wrote that the witness' expertise "may 
have been attained, so far as legal rules go, in any 
way whatever; all the law requires is that it should 
have been attained." 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 556, 
at 751 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
The Ohio cases have followed this approach. In 
Alexander v. Mt. Carmel Medical Center, 56 OS(2d) 
155, 383 NE(2d) 564 (1978), the Supreme Court com-
mented: "It is a general rule that the expert wit-
ness is not required to be the best witness on the 
subject ... The test is whether a particular witness 
offered as an expert will aid the trier of fact in the 
search for the truth." /d. at 159. 
Determining whether a witness is qualified as an 
expert is a decision for the trial court. Rule 104(A) 
provides that "[p]reliminary questions concerning 
the qualifications of a person to be a witness ... 
shall be determined by the court ... " This is con-
sistent with prior Ohio Jaw. In Turnpike Comm'n v. 
Ellis, 164 OS 377, 131 NE(2d) 397 (1955), the 
Supreme Court stated, "The qualification or com-
petency of a witness to testify as an expert or to 
give his opinion on a particular subject rests with 
the trial court, and, on appeal, its rulings with 
respect to such matters will ordinarily not be 
reversed unless there is a clear showing that the 
court abused its discretion." /d. (syllabus, para. 8). 
RULE 703: BASES OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Rule 703 specifies the bases for expert opinion 
testimony. The rule provides that an expert may 
base an opinion on data either (1) personally 
observed by tl')e expert or (2) admitted in evidence. 
Rule 703 must be read in conjunction with Rule 
705, which requires an expert to disclose the 
underlying bases of his opinion before giving the 
opinion and makes the use of the hypothetical 
question optional. 
Personal Knowledge 
Rule 703 provides that an expert may base an 
opinion on his personal knowledge. Typical ex-
amples are the forensic chemist who analyzes and 
testifies about the nature of a controlled sub-
stance or the pathologist who testifies about the 
cause of death. The Ohio cases have long recog-
nized that an expert may base an opinion on per-
sonal knowledge. See State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Chrysler Corp., 36 OS(2d) 151, 304 NE(2d) 891 
(1973); Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 
OS 6, 87 NE(2d) 156 (1949). 
Opinions Based on Admitted Evidence 
Rule 703 also provides that an expert may base 
an opinion on facts or data "admitted in evidence 
at the hearing." This is the second bases for ex-
pert opinions recognized by the rule. The first 
basis is the personal knowledge of the expert. If 
the expert has personal knowledge of all the 
underlying data upon which his opinion is based, 
there is no need to resort to this alternative basis. 
The typical method of providing an expert, who 
does not have personal knowledge, with the rele-
vant information upon which to base an opinion is 
the hypothetical question. Although a hypothetical 
question may still be used, its use is not required 
by the Rules of Evidence. Rule 705 explicitly pro-
vides that disclosure of the underlying basis of the 
opinion "may be in response to a hypothetical 
question or otherwise." The Staff Note to Rule 705 
states: "Rule 705 does not require the use of the 
hypothetical question .... [The expert) could be 
··· advised of [facts] by counsel, he could hear them 
adduced, or they could be stated to him in a hypo-
thetical question." Consequently, there are three 
ways in which an expert may be provided with 
assumed facts upon which to base an opinion. 
~ First, an expert present during the testimony of 
other witnesses may base an opinion on that tes-
timony. McCormick describes this method as 
follows: 
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In many jurisdictions, it seems permissible to have 
the expert witnesses in court during the taking of tes-
timony, and then when the expert is himself called as 
a witness, to simplify the hypothetical question by 
asking the expert to assume the truth of the previous 
testimony, or some specified part of it and to state 
his opinion upon that assumption. C. McCormick, Evi-
dence 32 (2d ed. 1972). 
Second, the underlying data may be supplied 
through evidence that the expert reviewed prior to 
trial, provided the evidence is eventually admitted 
at trial. For example, a pathologist may base his 
opinion as to the cause of death upon an autopsy 
which he performed and a report of a toxicologist. 
The autopsy involves the personal knowledge of 
the pathologist and an opinion based on such 
knowledge is permitted. If the toxicologist's report 
is admitted as an official record or business 
record, see Rules 803(6) & (8), the pathologist 
could also base his opinion on that report. See 
Kraner v. Coastal Tanker Lines, Inc. 26 OS(2d) 59, 
269 NE(2d) 43 (1971). In effect, the pathologist 
would be assuming the accuracy of the report. 
Third, an expert may base an opinion on as-
sumed facts that are presented to him in the form 
of a hypothetical question. In Burens v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 162 OS 549, 124 NE(2d) 724, (1955), the 
Supreme Court commented: "[E]xpert witnesses 
are not confined in their testimony to facts which 
are within their own personal knowledge but may 
state opinions which are based on assumed 
facts .... Ordinarily, such an opinion is elicited by 
a hypothetical question ... " /d. at 553. The Court 
in Burens, however, recognized an important limi-
tation on the use of hypothetical questions. "The 
hypothesis upon which a expert witness is asked 
to state an opinion must be based upon facts 
within the witness' own personal knowledge or 
upon facts shown by other evidence." /d. (syllabus, 
para. 1). Thus, an expert opinion cannot be based 
on assumed facts unless evidence tending to 
establish the assumed facts has been admitted in 
evidence. See Kraner v. Coastal Tank Lines, Inc., 
26 OS(2d) 59, 269 NE(2d) 43 (1971); Dillow v. Young, 
6 OS(2d) 221, 217 N E(2d) 868 (1966). 
Opinions Based on Hearsay 
Rule 703 does not permit an expert to base an 
opinion on hearsay evidence, unless the evidence 
falls within an exception to the hearsay rule and is 
admitted at trial. In contrast, Federal Rule 703 per-
mits an expert to base an opinion on inadmissible 
and unadmitted hearsay evidence. According to 
the federal rule, "[i]f of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts 
or data need not be admissible in evidence." 
Because this provision was not adopted in Ohio, 
the data upon which an expert bases an opinion 
must be admitted in evidence. 
RULE 704: OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE 
Rule 704 abolishes the ultimate issue rule. The 
ultimate issue prohibition was justified on the 
ground that opinions on ultimate issues "invade 
the province of the jury" or "usurp the function of 
the jury." See Trebotich v. Broglio, 33 OS(2d) 57, 
61, 294 NE(2d) 669, 672 (1973) ("clear invasion of 
the jury's province on the precise ultimate fact 
in issue."). 
The ultimate issue rule was deficient for several 
reasons. First, difficult questions of application 
are involved in distinguishing "ultimate facts" 
from other "facts." See C. McCormick, Evidence § 
12 (2d ed. 1972). Second, the witness can never 
usurp the function of the jury because the jury is 
not bound to accept a witness' opinion, including 
the opinion of an expert. See 7 J. Wignore, Evi· 
dence § 1920 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). Finally, the 
principal defect in the ultimate issue rule is that it 
established the wrong standard for the admissibil-
ity of opinion testimony. The issue should be . 
whether the opinion, lay or expert, assists the jury 
and not whether the opinion relates to the ultimate 
issues in the case. In many instances, the jury 
needs an opinion on issues that could be classi-
fied as "ultimate." For example, in a forgery case 
the only contested issue may be whether the de-
fendant forged a check. A handwriting expert, 
because of his training and experience, may be 
able to answer that question. In such a case, an 
opinion on the "ultimate issue" is both desirable 
and necessary. The expert, however, would not be 
permitted to testify that the defendant was 
"guilty;" he may testify on whether, based on his 
examination, he is of the opinion that known 
exemplars and the check were written by the same 
person. See Bell v. Brewster, 44 OS 690, 10 NE 679 
(1887). 
Abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not 
mean that all opinions on ultimate issues are now 
admissible. Rather, it means that the admissibility 
of such opinions is determined by the standards 
set forth in Rules 701 and 702. The Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Federal Rule 704 contains the fol-
lowing comment on this subject: 
The abolition of. the ultimate issue rule does not lower 
the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 
and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, 
and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which 
wastes time. These provisions afford ample assur-
ances against the admission of opinions which would 
merely tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in 
the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day. They 
also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms 
of inadequately explored legal criteria. Thus, the ques-
tion, "Did T have capacity to make a will?" would be 
excluded while the question, "Did T have sufficient 
mental c~pacity to know the nature and extent of his 
property and natural objects of his bounty and to for-
mulate a rational scheme of distribution?" would be 
allowed. 
RULE 705: DISCLOSURE OF 
BASES OF EXPERT OPINIONS 
Rule 705 governs the disclosure of the data or 
facts upon which an expert's opinion is based. The 
rule provides that disclosure of the facts or data 
underlying an expert's opinion must precede the 
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opinion. The rule also makes the use of the hypo-
thetical question in eliciting expert opinion testi-
mony optional. 
The purpose of the rule is to ensure that the jury 
is aware of the facts upon which the opinion rests. ,-( 
If the jury rejects those facts, it should also reject 
the opinion. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 680 
(Chadbourn rev. 1979). In addition, prior disclosure 
provides the opposing party with the opportunity 
to object on the ground that the opinion rests on 
an impermissible basis, such as hearsay evidence. 
RULE 801: HEARSAY DEFINITIONS 
Rule 801 defines hearsay. Rule 802 governs the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence. Under that rule 
hearsay is inadmissible in the absence of an ex-
ception. Rules 803 and 804 specify twenty-seven 
hearsay exceptions. 
Subdivisions (A), (B), and (C) of Rule 801 set 
forth a traditional definition of hearsay. Hearsay is 
defined as a written or oral statement, including 
conduct intended to be an assertion, made by a 
declarant out-of-court and offered for the truth of 
the assertions contained in the statement. In con-
trast subdivision (D) represents an important 
chan'ge in Ohio law. That rule provides that certain 
statements that would otherwise fall within the 
definition of subdivisions (A)-(C) are not hearsay 
and consequently not excludable as hearsay under 
Rule 802. Rule 801(0)(1) provides that certain prior 
inconsistent statements, prior consistent state-
ments, and statements of identifications are not 
hearsay. Rule 801(0)(2) provides that admissions of 
a party-opponent are not hearsay. 
The Rules of Evidence avoid the use of the term 
res gestae because that confusing phrase encom-
passes evidence which is not hearsay as well as 
evidence that is hearsay but may fall within one of 
the exceptions to the hearsay rule. See C. McCor-
mick, Evidence § 288 (2d ed. 1972). 
Definition of "Statement" 
Rule 801(A) de.fines a "statement" as "(1) an oral 
or wr\itten assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a 
person, if it is intended by him as an assertion." 
Oral and written assertions clearly present the 
hearsay dangers-Jack of cross-examination with 
respect to the declarant's perception, memory, nar-
ration, and sincerity. 
Rule 801 also treats nonverbal conduct intended 
as an assertion (assertive conduct) as hearsay. 
McCormick provides the following commentary 
and illustration: 
[l]t must be observed that the line of cleavage be-
tween conduct and statements is one that must be 
drawn in the light of substance, rather than form. No 
one would contend, if, in response to. a question "Who 
did it?", one of the auditors held up his hand, that 
this gesture could be treated as different from an oral 
or written statement, in the application of the hearsay 
rule. Obviously, though described in terms of conduct, 
the actions are as much a part of the speaker's effo~ 
at expression as his words are ... C. McCormick, Evi-
dence 596 (2d ed. 1972). 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 
801 provides another illustration: "Some nonverbal 
conduct, such as the act of pointing to identify a 
suspect in a lineup, is clearly the equivalent of 
words, assertive in nature, and to be regarded as a 
statement." 
Conduct that is not intended to be an assertion 
by the declarant is not encompassed by the defini-
tion of "statement" in Rule 801 (A). Consequently, 
the hearsay rule is not a bar to the admissibility of 
evidence of nonassertive conduct. Nonassertive 
conduct is sometimes referred to as "implied 
assertions." The leading case is Wright v. Doe 
D'Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837), which held im-
plied assertions or nonassertive conduct hearsay. 
See C. McCormick, Evidence 597-600 (2d ed. 1972). 
Rule 801(A) rejects this position. Thus, flight from 
the scene of a crime is not hearsay under Rule 801 
because such conduct is not intended to be an as-
sertion. See State v. Fields, 35 App(2d) 140, 300 
NE(2d) 207 (1973); State v. Whitley, 17 App(2d) 159, 
245 N E(2d) 232 (1969). 
Statements Offered for the Truth of the Assertion 
Rule 801(C) defines hearsay as "a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testify-
ing at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." This defini-
tion is consistent with the prior Ohio cases. In 
Potter v. Baker, 162 OS 488, 124 NE(2d) 140 (1955), 
the court held: "Testimony of a witness as to a 
statement or declaration by another person is 
hearsay testimony where that statement or declar-
ation is offered or used only to prove the truth of 
the matters asserted therein." /d. (Syllabus, 
para. 1). 
If the relevance of an out-of-court statement is 
that the statement was made and not the truth of 
the assertion contained in the statement, the 
statement is not hearsay. In such a case, the hear-
say dangers are not present. The declarant's per-
ception, memory, narration, and sincerity are not 
__ critical because the relevance of the statement 
does not depend on the veracity of the declarant. 
See C. McCormick, Evidence§ 249 (2d ed. 1972); 6 
J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1766 (Chadbourn rev. 1976). 
A number of examples of statements not offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted have been rec-
ognized. Several are discussed below. 
Verbal Acts 
The "verbal acts" rule involves verbal conduct 
"to which the law attaches duties and liabilities." 
C. McCormick, Evidence 588 (2d ed. 1972). In other 
words, the uttering of certain words has indepen-
dent legal significance under the substantive law. 
See 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1770 (Chadbourn rev. 
1976). For example, words constituting an at-
" tempted bribe are verbal acts. These statements 
~·-,are not offered to prove the truth of the assertion; 
Sthey are offered in evidence only to show that the 
;c; words were uttered. See also Staff Note ("Words 
' constituting conduct are not hearsay, e.g., words 
;_; of a contract, libel, slander, threats and the like."). 
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Statements Offered to Show Effect on Hearer 
In many criminal cases a person's state of mind 
-his knowledge, belief, good faith, reasonable-
ness- is an issue. See C. McCormick, Evidence 
589-90 (2d ed. 1972); 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1789 
(Chadbourn rev. 1976). For example, if an accused 
claims self-defense, his reasonable fear of the vic-
tim becomes an issue. Consequently, statements 
made to the defendant informing him that the vic-
tim is a dangerous or violent person are relevant to 
show his subjective state of mind. These state-
ments are not offered to show that the victim was, 
in fact, a dangerous or violent person, but only to 
show that such information was communicated to 
the defendant. See McGaw v. State, 123 OS 196, 
174 NE 741 (1931); State v. Roderick, 77 OS 301, 82 
NE 1082 (1907). 
Statements Offered to Show Circumstantially 
Declarant's State of Mind 
A person's mental state is often a consequential 
or material issue. If that person makes a statement 
that manifests his state of mind, the statement is 
relevant. Frequently, such statements are hearsay, 
but fall within the exception for presently existing 
state of mind. See Rule 803(3). In other cases, the 
statements only circumstantially show the declar-
ant's state of mind. In these cases the statement 
is not offered to prove the truth of the assertion 
and thus does not implicate the hearsay rule. See 
C. McCormick, Evidence 590-93 (2d ed. 1972). 
One of the more difficult examples involves 
statements by a defendant offered to establish in-
sanity. Thus, if the defendant has stated "I am the 
Emperor of Africa," the statement is not offered to 
prove that the defendant is the Emperor of Africa. 
Instead, the statement is offered as evidence of 
the defendant's insane delusions. This analysis, 
however, is not free of criticism. See C. McCor-
mick, Evidence 593 (2d ed. 1972); 6 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 1766, at 250 & n.l. (Chadbourn rev. 
1976). 
Prior Inconsistent Statements 
Rule 801(D)(1)(a) provides that certain types of 
prior inconsistent statements are admissible as 
substantive evidence. The rule accomplishes this 
result by defining such statements as nonhearsay. 
The following conditions must be satisfied before 
a prior statement is admissible under the rule: (1) 
the declarant must testify, subject to cross-
examination, at the trial or hearing; (2) the prior 
statement must be inconsistent with the witness' 
trial testimony; (3) the prior statement must have 
been given under oath; (4) the prior statement must 
have been "subject to cross-examination by the 
party against whom the statement is offered;" and 
(5) the prior statement must have been "subject to 
the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding, or in a deposition ... " 
The rule represents a change in Ohio law. Under 
prior law, prior inconsistent statements were ad-
missible only for impeachment; such statements 
were not offered for the truth of assertion con-
tained therein but only to show that the statement 
was made and is inconsistent with the witness' 
trial testimony. See McKelvey Co. v. General 
Casualty Co., 166 OS 401, 405, 142 NE(2d) 854, 856 
(1957); State v. Duffey, 134 OS 16, 24, 15 NE(2d) 
535, 539 (1938). 
Rule 801(D)(1)(a) differs from its federal counter-
part. Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not require that 
the prior statement have been subject to cross-
examination at the time it was made. Statements 
made at a prior trial, a preliminary hearing, Grim. 
R. 5(B), a deposition, Grim. R. 15, or any other pro-
ceding at which testimony is taken under oath 
subject to penalty of perjury and cross-
examination would qualify under Rule 80i(D)(1)(a). 
In contrast to the federal rule, statements made 
before a grand jury would not qualify because 
such statements are not subject to cross-
examination. Grand jury statements, however, are 
admissible if offered for impeachment and incon-
sistent with the witness' trial testimony. See 
Rule 613. 
Prior Consistent Statements 
Rule 801(D)(1)(b) provides that prior consistent 
statements of a witness are admissible as sub-
stantive evidence if "offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motive." The rule represents 
a change in Ohio law. Under prior law, prior con-
sistent statements were generally inadmissible 
even if offered only for rehabilitation. Such state-
ments, however, were admissible if offereo to 
rebut a charge of recent fabrication, Miller v. Piqua 
Transfer & Storage Co., 57 Abs 325, 92 NE(2d) 452 
(CP 1950), in which case the statement could be 
considered for rehabilitative purposes but not as 
substantive evidence. 
In contrast to the rule on prior inconsistent 
statements, Rule 801(D)(1)(a), a prior consistent 
statement need not be given under oath subject to 
penalty of perjury and cross-examination. 
Statement of Identification 
Rule 801 (D)(i)(C) provides that a witness' prior 
statement "of identification of a person soon after 
perceiving" that person is admissible as substan-
tive evidence "if the circumstances demonstrate 
the reliability of the prior identification." 
The rule apparently changes Ohio law. R.C. 
2945.55 provides: "When identification of the de-
fendant is an issue, a witness who has on a pre-
vious occasion identified such person may testify 
to such previous identification. Such identification 
m~y be proved by other witnesses." On its face, 
this statute would appear to permit the substantive 
use of prior identifications. In State v. Lancaster, 
25 OS(2d) 83, 267 NE(2d) 291 (1971), however, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the statute as permit-
ting the use of prior identifications only as corrob-
orative, as opposed to substantive, evidence. /d. 
(syllabus, para. 5). Under the corroboration theory, 
the witness had to make an in-court identification 
prior to the admission of evidence of a prior iden-
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tification. Under the rule, prior identifications are 
admissible as substantive evidence and thus an in-
court identification is not a prerequisite to 
admissibility so long as the witness who has made 
the prior identification is "subject to cross-
examination" at trial. See Staff Note; United States · 
v. Ingram, 600 F(2d) 260, 261 (10th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Lewis, 565 F(2d) 1248, 1250-52 (2d Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 435 US 973 (1978). 
As the Staff Note indicates, the rule does not 
"obviate[] the constitutional requirements relating 
to lineups and the like ... "The rule covers only 
the hearsay aspects of pretrial identifications. In 
criminal cases identification evidence also must 
satisfy Sixth Amendment and due process require-
ments. The Sixth Amendment requires the pres-
ence of counsel at some types of identification 
procedures. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 US 220 (1977) 
(preliminary hearings); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 US 682 
(1972) (right to counsel attaches at commencement 
of judicial adversary proceedings); State v. Lathan, 
30 OS(2d) 92, 282 N E(2d) 57 4 (1972). 
Due process requires identification evidence to 
be reliable. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98 
(1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 US 188 (1972); State v. 
Madison, 64 OS(2d) 322 (1980); State v. Kaiser, 56 
OS(2d) 29, 381 NE(2d) 633 (1978). 
Admissions of a Party-Opponent 
Rule 801(D)(2) exempts admissions of a party-
opponent from the scope of the hearsay rule. Rule 
801(D)(2)(a) provides that statements of a party are 
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admissible as substantive evidence if offered · 
against that party. Numerous Ohio cases have rec-
ognized the admissibility of party admissions. See 
generally Note, Admissions "Against Interest" in 
Ohio, 15 Ohio St.L.J. 187 (1954). 
The confession of a criminal defendant is an ad-
mission of a party-opponent. Some Ohio cases at-
tempt to distinguish confessions and admissions, 
confessions being a complete acknowl-edgment of 
guilt whereas admissions are something less. See 
State v. Klumpp, 15 Ops(2d) 461, 175 NE(2d) 767 
(App. 1960). The distinction is not important. Both 
confessions and admissions are admissible under 
Rule 801(D)(2)(a) and the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held the distinction irrelevant when a statement 
obtained from a defendant by the police is chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds. See Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 US 436, 476-77 (1966). 
Rule 801(D)(2)(a) governs only the hearsay 
aspects of admissions. It is not concerned with 
the constitutional requirements surrounding the 
obtaining of statements from defendants by the 
police. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966) 
(5th Amendment requirements); Brewer v. Williams, 
430 US 387 (1977) (6th Amendment requirements). 
See generally C. McCormick, Evidence ch. 14 
(2d ed. 1972); C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure 
ch. 15 (1980). 
A plea of guilty in a criminal case is an admis-
sion of a party-opponent and thus may be admis-
sible in a subsequent case. See Clinger v. Duncan 
166 OS 216, 141 NE(2d) 156 (1957); Freas v. Sulli-
van, 130 OS 486, 200 NE 639 (1936); Clark v. Irvin, 9 
Ohio 131 (1839); Wilcox v. Gregory, 112 App 516, 
176 NE(2d) 523 (1960). Rule 410, however, prohibits 
& the admissibility of guilty pleas that are subse-t, quently withdrawn, pleas of no contest, pleas of 
guilty in a violations bureau, offers to plead guilty 
and no contest, and statements made in connec-
tion with and relevant to such pleas and offers. 
Pleas of guilty not falling within the exclusion of 
Rule 410 are admissible as admissions. See also 
Rule 803(21) (admissibility of judgments of prior 
convictions). 
Adoptive Admissions 
Rule 801(D)(2)(b) provides that statements about 
which a party "has manifested his adoption or 
belief in its truth" are admissible as substantive 
evidence if offered against that party. A party may 
expressly adopt the statement of a third person or 
he may acquiesce by failing to deny or correct the 
statement of a third person under circumstances 
in which it would be natural to deny or correct the 
truth of the statement (adoption by silence). See 
State v. Swiger, 5 OS(2d) 151, 159-60, 214 NE(2d) 
417, 424 cert. denied, 385 US 874 (1966) (express 
adoption); State v. Poole, 50 App(2d) 204, 362 
NE(2d) 678 (1976) (express adoption). 
The Ohio cases have recognized the admission-
by-silence rule See Hoover v. State, 91 OS 41, 47, 
109 NE 626, 628 (1914); Murphy v. State, 36 OS 628 
(1881). In Zeller v. State, 123 OS 519, 176 NE 81 
' '(1931), the Supreme Court stated: "The only theory 
upon which any confession by silence is admis-
sible is that the statement of the third person, in 
the presence of the accused, is made under such 
circumstances that the silence of the accused 
gives rise to a natural and reasonable inference of 
assent thereto ... " /d. at 523. In many cases, 
however, the courts have found that the circum· 
stances did not require a response. E.g., Ze/ler v. 
State, supra; Geiger v. State, 70 OS 400, 71 NE 721 
:____ (1904); Griffin v. Zipperwich and Lodge, 28 OS 388, 
409 (1876); Walker v. State, 37 App 540, 175 NE 29 
(1930). In Geiger v. State, supra, the court com-
mented on the admissibility of "a confession by 
silence": "We cannot refrain from the observation, 
that before a court admits this class of confes-
sions, great caution should be exercised ... It is 
not every instance of silence in the hearing of ac-
cusation that renders it admissible, as admitting 
guilt." /d. at 413. 
The application of the adoption-by-silence rule in 
criminal cases is limited by constitutional prin-
ciples. In State v. Stephens, 24 OS(2d) 76, 263 
NE(2d) 773 (1970), the Supreme Court commented 
on the admissibility of a defendant's silence fol-
lowing arrest: "In the first detention of a suspect it 
:;;c is not uncommon to react by refusing to discuss 
~t-\ the charges until a lawyer can be retained. Desire 
£pfor friendly counsel and advice can be a major mo-
~,;iJivation at that time in the mind of one completely ~'. innocent of the charges, as well as one who sub-




[against self-incrimination] at that time is silence 
... he should not thereafter be penalized for his 
original refusal." /d. at 81. See also State v. Perry-
man, 49 OS(2d) 14, 358 NE(2d) 1040 (1976), vacated 
on other grounds, 438 US 911 (1978). 
In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 US 610 (1976), the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the examination of a de-
fendant at trial concerning his post-arrest silence 
after receiving Miranda warnings violated due 
process. Consequently, a defendant's silence in 
face of an accusation by the police, an accom-
plice, or victim cannot be admitted in evidence if 
Miranda warnings were or should have been given. 
Coconspirator Admissions 
Rule 801 (D)(2)(e) provides that statements by a 
coconspirator of a party made during and in fur-
therance of the conspiracy are admissible as sub-
stantive evidence if offered against that party. The 
coconspirator rule applies if five conditions are 
established: (1) the existence of a conspiracy, 
(2) the defendant's participation in the conspiracy, 
(3) the declarant's participation in the conspiracy, 
(4) the statement was made during the course of 
the conspiracy, and (5) the statement was in fur-
therance of the conspiracy. In many cases in 
which conspiracy is charged, resort to this rule is 
unnecessary. If the statement involved the agree-
ment (the actus reus of conspiracy), the statement 
may be admissible under the verbal acts doctrine. 
See 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 
357-61 (1980). 
A conspiracy commences when the agreement 
is reached and terminates when the objectives 
have been achieved or abandoned. See R.C. 
2923.01 (E). Once the conspiracy ends, statements 
of coconspirators are not admissible. See Sharpe 
v. State, 29 OS 263 (1876). Determining the time 
when the conspiracy terminates has proven to be a 
troublesome issue. Termination depends on the 
objectives of the conspiracy. The traditional view 
is that statements made after the objectives have 
been achieved, but while the conspirators are at-
tempting to avoid detection (the concealment 
phase) are inadmissible. C. McCormick, Evidence 
646 (2d ed. 1972). The Ohio Supreme Court has not 
always followed this rule. In Sfate v. Shelton, 51 
OS(2d) 68, 364 NE(2d) 1152 (1977), vacated on other 
grounds, 438 US 909 (1978), the Court held: "A 
declaration of a conspirator, made subsequent to 
the actual commission of the crime, may be ad-
missible against any coconspirator if it was made 
while the conspirators were still concerned with 
the concealment of their criminal conduct or their 
identity." /d. (syllabus, para. 2). Accord, State v. 
DeRighter, 145 OS 552, 558-59, 62 NE(2d) 332, 
335-336 (1945). 
Concealment phase statements, however, are 
not admissible under Rule 801(D)(2)(e). The Advis-
ory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 801 reads: 
"The rule is consistent with the position of the 
Supreme Court in denying admissibility to state-
ments made after the objectives of the conspiracy 
have either failed or been achieved. Krulewitch v. 
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 
790 (1949); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 490, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.(2d) 441 (1963)." The 
federal rule, as stated in Kru/ewitch and Wong 
Sun, has consistently excluded concealment 
phase statements. 
Independent Evidence; Standard of Proof 
Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E) has been the source of 
controversy. A number of issues have divided the 
federal courts: (1) whether the conspiracy may be 
established by the statement itself or only by inde-
pendent proof; (2) whether the admissibility of co-
conspirator statements is controlled by Federal 
Rule 104(a) or by Rule 104(b); and (3) the standard 
of proof. See 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal 
Evidence 207-14 (1977); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence ,104[05] (1980). 
The first issue is resolved by the Rules of Evi-
dence. The Ohio rule requires that the conspiracy, 
-as well as the declarant's and defendant's partici-
pation, be established "upon independent proof of 
the conspiracy." 
Determining whether admissibility of coconspir-
ator statements is governed by Rule 104(A) or Rule 
104(B) and determining the standard of proof-
prima facie case, preponderance of evidence, or 
some other standard-involves related issues. 
Rule 104(A) provides that the court shall determine 
questions concerning "the admissibility of evi-
dence." That provision, however, is subject to Rule 
104(B), which provides: "When the relevancy of evi-
dence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition 
of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, 
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the introduction of _evidence sufficient to S'upport a 
finding of the fulfillment of the condition." If Rule 
_104(B) governs, the prima facie case standard ap-
plies. The "introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condi-
tion" is equivalent to requiring a prima facie case 
of conspiracy. See 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence ,104[05] (1980). 
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, 
the Ohio cases had used the prima facie case 
standard. See State v. Thomas, 61 OS(2d) 223, 232, 
400 NE(2d) 401, 407 (1980); State v. Weind, 50 
OS(2d) 224, 240, 364 NE(2d) 216, 235 (1977), vacated 
on other grounds, 438 US 911 (1978). It is question-
able, however, whether the prima facie standard 
survived the adoption of the Rules of Evidence. 
The majority of federal courts that have considered 
the issue have held that Federal Rule 104(a) gov-
erns admissibility, i.e., the court alone determines 
the existence of a conspiracy. See United States v. 
Petersen, 611 F(2d) 1313, 1330 (10th Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Pappas, 611 F(2d) 399, 405 (1st Cir. 
1979); United States v. James, 590 F(2d) 575, 579-80 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 US 917 (1979); United 
States v. Enright, 579 F(2d) 980, 985 (6th Cir. 1978). 
The majority of federal courts have also en-
dorsed the preponderance of evidence standard. 
See United States v. Pappas, 611 F(2d) 399, 404-05 
(1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Continental Group, 
Inc., 603 F(2d) 444, 457 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
444 US 1032 (1980); United States v. James, 590 
F(2d) 575, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 
US 917 (1979); United States v. Bell, 573 F(2d) 1040 
(8th Cir. 1978). 
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